Vendor\u27s Tort Liability by Eldredge, Laurence H.
January, i941
VENDOR'S TORT LIABILITY
LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE j
The scope of this Article is an analysis of the nature and extent
of the purely tort liability of a vendor of a chattel which is likely to
cause harm unless the purchaser is aware of the danger lurking in it.
This danger may be a normal attribute of the type of chattel involved
or it may result from the fact that danger-creating defects exist in a
type of chattel normally considered harmless. Liability based upon
the breach of an express warranty, or of an implied warranty (or
condition) under Sections 12 and 15 of the Uniform Sales Act, or
under preexisting decisions, will receive only incidental consideration.
Other writers have plowed that field of law, particularly with reference
to the unwholesome food cases I in which the question most frequently
arises. In addition, although the action for breach of warranty orig-
inally developed as a tort action, 2 today it has many attributes and
limitations of an action for breach of contract and in more than a few
jurisdictions the plaintiff must pursue the theory that he is suing on a
contract, and seeking consequential damages for the personal injury or
other harm he suffers.
3
Although it has been suggested that liability for breach of war-
ranty is in reality a liability based upon negligence,4 it seems clear that
to the extent this liability can be considered a tort liability it is another
example of an absolute liability which is imposed upon a vendor who
neither knew, nor by the exercise of the most meticulous precautions
could have known, of the danger hidden in the warranted chattel. That
is particularly true of the vendor of canned foods which have been
packed by a reputable packer, the true condition of which the vendor
cannot know until he is told of the plaintiff's illness caused by the
unwholesome contents. The fact that such a vendor sold the war-
t B. S., 1924, Lafayette College; LL. B., 1927, University of Pennsylvania; Ad-
viser, RESTATEMENT, TORTS (934); member of the Philadelphia Bar; Professor of
Law, University of Pennsylvania; author of RESTATEMENT, TORTS, PA. ANNOT. (1938) ;
Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 467; Culpable
Intervention as Superseding Cause (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. I2I; Tort Liability
to Trespassers (1937) 12 TEMiP. L. Q. 32; and other articles in legal periodicals.
i. Brown, The Liability of Retail Dealers for Defective Food Products (1939) 23
MiNN. L. REV. 585; Perkins, Unwholesome Food as a Source of Liability (919) 5
IowA LAW BULL. 6, 86.
2. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) 2689; Note (1929) 42 HARv. L.
REV. 414.
3. See, e. g., Daniels v. R. White & Sons, 82 SoL J. 912 (K. B. 1938); Grant v.
Australian Knitting Mills, Ltd. [1936] A. C. 85; WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924)
§§ 244, 614, 614a.
4. Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, io2 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931).
(306)
VENDOR'S TORT LIABILITY
ranted food in "the original package" does not help him escape lia-
bility,5 as it does where the vendor's negligence is in question.6 Perhaps
the Achilles heel of a vendor who feels himself secure in the defense
of a sale in "the original package", at least when attacked by a plaintiff
who can wield the implied warranty spear, is the warranty, under
Section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act and under Section 14 of the
English Sale of Goods Act, of "merchantable quality".
7
By the word "vendor" is meant a person who sells a chattel but
who did not manufacture, compound, pack, or otherwise create the
finished product which is sold. Normally he is the retailer, though he
may be a wholesaler. In discussing the liability for harm caused by
dangerously defective chattels courts have frequently grouped together,
manufacturers, contractors, and vendors as though they occupied the
same role and their liability was governed by the same rules. This
may have been well enough in the days when all three of them were
almost equally free from liability to persons with whom they had no
contractual relations. But it was never an accurate grouping, and
since the modern development of a manufacturer's liability, particularly
since Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 8 it has been positively mis-
leading. No single rule will explain the extent of a vendor's liability
and in certain situations the manufacturer of a dangerously defective
chattel may be liable for harm caused by it while the vendor who sells
it is not.
Any reasonable man who manufactures an article which, if de-
fectively made, is reasonably certain to be a thing of danger and to
place life and limb in peril, can foresee that unless he acts with com-
petence, skill, attention and care he is actively creating an unreasonable
risk of harm to a determinable class of persons.9 In such a situation
attention and care involve inspections in the course of manufacture to
determine whether the materials used by the manufacturer are adequate
for the use for which they are being prepared. In other words the
manufacturer who carelessly and inattentively creates an automobile,
for example, can foresee that he is engaging in an activity which is
unreasonably dangerous to persons who will use the finished product
and to travelers in its path, just as much as the person who carelessly
and inattentively drives even a perfect automobile can foresee that he
5. Daniels v. R. White & Sons, 82 SOL. J. 912 (K. B. 1938) ; Brown, note I supra.
6. West v. Emanuel, I98 Pa. ISo, 47 Atl. 965 (igol) ; RFSTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)
§ 401, comment a.
7. See the devastating application of this to the vendor of sulphite impregnated
underpants in Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85, which, however,
did not involve a sale in an original package. See Naumann v. Wehle Brewing Co.,
15 A. (2d) 181 (Conn. 194o). See also 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936)
§ 983 at 2709, § 987 at 2716.
8. 217 N. Y. 382, III N. E. lO5O (1916).
9. Compare RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §395.
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is engaging in an activity which is unreasonably dangerous to himself,
others in the car and travelers in its path. The fact that after the
automobile was finished the defect was hidden and then undiscoverable
by any practicable inspection by the manufacturer does not help him
any more than the inattentive motorist's sudden attempt at the last
moment to avert a collision helps him escape liability for his prior
active misconduct. In both cases the antecedent active negligence is
the basis of liability. In both cases the actor has knowledge which
warns him of the unreasonable risk inherent in his active conduct.10
On the other hand the competent, careful and attentive operator
of a new automobile of a standard make who does not know that it
contains a dangerous defect cannot foresee that his operation of it
creates an unreasonable risk of harm to anybody. Aside from the
mass of general information which every man is required to possess, 1
in order to determine the risk inherent in his activity, the reasonable-
ness of a particular activity is determined by the actor's actual knowl-
edge at the time he acts. 12  By the same token the vendor of that
automobile, who is equally ignorant of its defect, cannot foresee that
the sale and delivery of it to the operator is an act which is unreason-
ably dangeroris to him or to anybody else. If liability is imposed on
such a vendor or purchaser it cannot be (as in the case of the manu-
facturer) upon any theory of active negligence; the liability must be
founded upon what the purchaser or vendor failed to do, upon the
omission to inspect and discover the unknown danger. There is a
real difference between the case of one who, on the facts known to
him, acted in a manner foreseeably dangerous and of one whose
activity appeared to be innocent and was made dangerous only by the
existence of an unknown although discoverable fact. The extent to
which a vendor is under an affirmative duty to discover unknown
dangers in chattels he handles will be considered in succeeding pages.
The situation is entirely different when the vendor actually knows
that the chattel he is selling contains a hidden defect which makes
perilous its normal and foreseeable use. The "hidden defect" is
stressed because generally the foreseeable peril results from the com-
bination of the defect and the purchaser's ignorance of its existence.
In many cases the purchaser's knowledge of the defect will remove the
10. So, too, a contractor who builds something which unless carefully and com-
petently made will become a trap, can foresee the unreasonable risk in his careless
and inattentive activity and should be liable to any person likely to be and injured
thereby. The lack of "privity" which allowed the creator of a death trap to escape
liability in Curtin v. Somerset, 14o Pa. 70, 21 Atl. 244 (1891) was not persuasive in
Grodstein v. McGivern, 3o3 Pa. 555, 154 Atl. 794 (I931). See also RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1934) §404.
ii. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§290, 302.
12. Id. § 282, comment g.
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danger in the use of the chattel. Even if it does not it would seem
that so far as the purchaser, or any other person having knowledge
of the defect, is concerned, the use of the known dangerous chattel
would constitute a true voluntary assumption of risk, just as the use
by even a business guest of premises on which there is a dangerous
condition known to him constitutes a voluntary assumption of risk by
him.' 3 It would be an unusual case in which it could be successfully
argued that the vendor was absolutely prohibited from selling a danger-
ously defective chattel to one who knew the facts because of the risk
that the purchaser would none the less use the chattel dangerously and
injure a third person or turn the chattel over to the third person with-
out warning of the defect. It seems likely that in any ordinary case
such intervening negligence by the purchaser would be considered
extraordinary and would operate as a superseding cause even if the
vendor's sale could be considered an act of negligence with respect to
the third person. 14 It seems safe to assume that ordinarily the vendor's
duty does not go beyond exercising reasonable care to warn the pur-
chaser of the defect.
If he does not, and the purchaser is ignorant of the defect and
unlikely to discover it for himself, it is clear that the vendor's act of
delivering the chattel is an act fraught with foreseeable peril, the extent
of which varies with the amount of harm likely to result from the
particular chattel in question. It is difficult to understand why a
number of courts still cling to the so-called distinction between "in-
herently dangerous" articles and other articles in discussing the lia-
bility of both manufacturers and vendors. Professor Bohlen 'r and
Judge Cardozo 6 long ago showed the fallacy of it and recently it has
been pointed out again by Mr. Justice Maxey in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. 17 There are few things more innocuous than a piece
of rope; yet if it is defective and is sold for use in sustaining a high
scaffold, far more danger inheres in it than in unwholesome food,
which seldom causes more than a temporary illness. How can judges,
who regularly dispose of three meals a day, and have, all their lives,
without untoward effect, solemnly designate food as "inherently dan-
gerous" and deny that designation to other articles normally equally
harmless but far more lethal when defective than unwholesome food,
particularly when the defect is hidden and the article is therefore a
r3. See Eldredge, Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair (1936) 84 U. OF PA.
L. RE V: 467, 469-70; RESTATEIIENT, TORTS (1934) § 340, comment e.
14. RESTATFMENT, TORTS § 447; compare § 389 with Wissman v. General Tire
Co., 327 Pa. 215, 192 Atl. 633 (1937).
X5. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 109, 131-37.
i6. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, III N. E. io5o (i916).
17. Ebbert v. Phila. Electric Co., 330 Pa. 257, i98 Atl. 323 (1938).
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wolf in sheep's clothing? The Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts long ago decided that the caterer who served the bad deviled
crab to the banquet guest was liable to him despite the absence of
privity of contract.' 8 Yet twelve years after Mac Pherson v. Buick
Motor Co. this same court, apparently with its head in the ground but
not with its feet on it, unanimously held that the defendant who sold
machinery and prepared and furnished defective plans for a stone bin
designed to hold 15o tons, and under which teams and trucks were to
stop to be loaded, was not liable for the death of a teamster, crushed
under 75 tons of stone when this man trap collapsed. 9 In some parts
of the United States the sunshine of Cardozo's wisdom still falls on
stony ground, although its rays have brought forth fruit across the
seas.
20
CHATTELS KNOWN TO BE DANGEROUS
Langridge v. Levy 21 appears to be the first case involving the
liability of the vendor of a known defective chattel. The defendant
sold a known cheap defective gun to plaintiff's father and actively
represented it to be a high grade Nock gun. He knew it was pur-
chased for the plaintiff, who used it, relying upon the representation,
and was injured when the gun exploded. Baron Parke considered the
case as one of deceit based upon the defendant's fraudulent repre-
sentation and held the defendant liable.2 2  On the facts this is satis-
factory but in many cases some of the essential elements of a deceit
action are not present. This is true where the vendor does not say
anything or actively conceal the defect and hence there is no repre-
sentation, unless resort is had to the fiction that the delivery of the
chattel in itself is an implied representation that it contains no known
hidden defect. Also a deceit action would fail where the plaintiff did
not rely upon the representation (as in the case of an innocent by-
stander injured by the chattel) or the vendor did not intend the plaintiff
to rely upon it.
23
In view of the modern concept of what is active negligence there
is no need to resort to any theory of fraud. So far as foreseeable peril
is concerned there is not much difference between selling a perfect gun
18. Bishop v. Weber, 139 Mass. 411, 1 N. E. 154 (1885).
19. Christensen v. Bremer, 263 Mass. 129, i6o N. E. 410 (1928) (It is difficult
to understand the explanation for such a revolting decision).
2o. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562 (P. C.) ; Grant v. Australian Knit-
ting Mills, Ltd., [1936] A. C. 85 (men's "underpants" here involved and probably
worn by many judges are not generally considered "inherently dangerous").
21. (837) 2 M. & W. 519, 15o Eng. Rep. R. 8631 (Ex.).
22. The decision was affirmed upon this theory in the Exchequer chamber:
(1838) 4 M. & W. 337, 15o Eng. Rep. R. 1458 (Ex.). That fraud was the basis
of liability was emphasized by both Lord Buckmaster and Lord Atkin in Donoghue
v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562, 567, 588 (P. C.).
23. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§531, 537.
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to a boy of tender years 24 and a known defective gun to an adult. In
both cases, on the facts known to the vendor, he did an act which
foreseeably created an unreasonable risk of injury to a determinable
class of people, and as to that class he was actively negligent. The
same can be said of the sale of defective rope to support a scaffold.
Indeed the sale of a normally innocuous chattel which contains a defect
making it dangerous creates a greater risk of harm than selling a
chattel which even when perfect is dangerous. The latter carries its
own warning to handle it with great care, while the nature of the
former lulls the user into a feeling of safety in using it and thereby
increases the extent of the risk. Thus it is not surprising to find that
in a later English case,25 in which there was knowledge of the defect
but no active representation, the vendor's liability was based upon
negligence and Langridge v. Levy was not mentioned. The American
cases have proceeded upon the same theory.26  In this type of case the
fact that the defendant is a vendor is of no controlling significance.
27
Liability is based upon the fact that he is a person who has acted
negligently,28 and the same liability would be imposed upon a donor 29
or a bailor. 30
The person who happens to be a vendor may be guilty of other
types of negligent acts. He may carelessly hand out the wrong drug
24. McMillen v. Steele, 275 Pa. 584, n9 Atl. 721 (1923).
25. Clarke v. Army & Navy Co-operative Society, Ltd., [I9O3] i K. B. 155. The
case involved the sale of a can of chlorinated lime. The only defect was in the con-
tainer. When the top was pried off, lime flew up into plaintiff's eye. The vendor
did not know of any defect in this particular can but did know that other purchasers
of cans from the same lot had had a similar experience. The vendor's negligence was
in delivering the can without warning the plaintiff of this risk so she could avoid it.
26. Lewis v. Terry, iii Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398 (1896) (injuries to tenant of pur-
chaser of folding bed. Vendor did represent bed to be safe, but this factor is not
an element of liability in the rule announced as applicable) ; Huset v. Case Thresh-
ing Machine Co., 12o Fed. 865 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903) (defendant was in fact the man-
ufacturer); Gerkin v. Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N. W. 48 (913)
(plaintiff was injured by dyed fur collar on coat purchased from defendant. De-
fendant did not know of any defect in the coat, but did know that i1% of purchasers
would be injured by any dyed fur collar, and delivered the coat without warning
to that effect); Karsteadt v. Gross Co., I79 Wis. IIO, I9O N. W. 844 (1922) (de-
fendant warned plaintiff only as to some of the dangers to avoid in using the wash-
ing machine); Guinan v. Famous-Players Laskey Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 167 N. E.
235 (1929) (defendant was a donor rather than a vendor but the court discusses the
case in terms of vendor, and classifies inflammable movie film as "inherently dan-
gerous") ; Farley v. E. E. Tower & Co., Inc., 27I Mass. 230, 171 N. E. 630 (I93O)
(inflammable comb classified as "inherently dangerous"); Siler v. Morgan Motor
Co., 15 F. Supp. 468 (E. D. Ky. 1936) (automobile); Baker v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 16 F. Supp. 925 (S. D. Cal. 1936) (stove) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (934) § 399.
Cf. Wissman v. General Tire Co., 327 Pa. 215, 192 Atl. 633 (937).
27. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 388.
28. Where liability is based upon a theory of breach of warranty the defend-
ant's status as a vendor is frequently of controlling importance.
29. Guinan v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 267 Mass. 501, 167 N. E. 235 (1929).
3o. As in Farrant v. Barnes, ix C. B. N. S. 553, 142 Eng. Rep. R. 912 (1862).
The defendant delivered a carboy of nitric acid to a carrier without warning his
servant, the plaintiff, of the dangerous nature of the contents, and the servant was
severely burned in handling the carboy. Erle, C. J., Willes, and Keating, J.J., unani-
mously held for the plaintiff.
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prescriptions; 31 or carelessly deliver a poisonous article instead of a
safe one; 32 or sprinkle rat poison in such proximity to a flour bin that
it is likely to be carried into it by the rodents, 33 or he may actively
install a perfect chattel in such an incompetent and careless manner as
to create an unreasonable risk of harm.3 4 In all of these cases liability
is clear. Yet some courts, overlooking the fact that the case involves
merely the application of familiar rules of negligence to a defendant
who happens to be a vendor have erroneously denied liability upon the
quite immaterial grounds that there was an absence of "privity of
contract" and that the chattel itself (which was in no way defective)
was not "inherently or imminently dangerous".
3 5
Although the presence of an active conscious misrepresentation is
not essential to liability it is by no means an unimportant factor when
present. An active misrepresentation may be by words or by actively
concealing the defect. If this is coupled with a delivery of a chattel,
known to be dangerous, under circumstances which make it substan-
tially certain that harm will follow, the vendor may be considered
guilty of an intentional tort.36 Even where harm is not substantially
certain the active misrepresentation increases the foreseeable risk of
harm by deterring a possible investigation and thus bears not only upon
the question of negligence 37 but also upon that of contributory negli-
gence.
A good example is State to use of Hartlove v. Fox & Son.3 8
The vendor of a horse, knowing it had glanders, a communicable
31. See Beckwith v. Oatman, 43 Hun 265 (N. Y. 1887) (on the facts this is
really a case of defective compounding, similar to defective manufacturing).
32. Wright v. Howe, 46 Utah 588, 15o Pac. 956 (1915).
33. Heinemann v. Barfield, 136 Ark. 456, 207 S. W. 58 (1918).
34. McGuire v. Dalton Co., 191 So. 158 (La. App. 1939) (gas range) ; Crandall
v. Boutell, 95 Minn. 114, 103 N. W. 89o (195o) (stove); Jaeger v. Elizabethtown
Consol. Gas Co., 124 N. J. L. 42o, ii A. (2d) 746 (194o) (gas range); Cox v.
Mason, 89 App. Div. 219, 85 N. Y. Supp. 973 (2d Dep't 1903) (folding bed). Where
the defendant assures the plaintiff, after the work is done, that the chattel may be
safely used, as in the Jaeger case, liability may be based upon the additional rule
that the negligent performance of work, even when gratuitously undertaken, is action-
able as the creation of a trap when harm results. A familiar example is the case of
a landlord's gratuitous repairs negligently carried out: Gill v. Middleton, 1o5 Mass.
477 (1870); RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 362.
35. Bensinger Outfitting Co. v. Seaman's Adm'r., 213 Ky. 157, 280 S. W. 941
(1926) ; Osheroff v. Rhodes-Burford Co., 2o3 Ky. 408, 262 S. W. 583 (1924) ; Kil-
crease v. Galtney Motor Co., 149 Miss. 703, 115 So. 193 (1928).
36. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 13, comment d, and § 310, comment a.
37. Id. at § 310.
38. 79 Md. 514 (1894). A recent interesting example of the same point is Pease
v. Sinclair Refining Co., 104 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) in which the defendant
sent free to the plaintiff (and other school teachers) a "Sinclair Exhibit" showing
various forms of oil in labelled bottles. To prevent discoloration and to permit mail-
ing the defendant had substituted water in the bottle labelled "Kerosene". The
plaintiff, preparing for a classroom chemistry experiment, poured the "Kerosene"
over a piece of Sodium. Sodium is preserved in kerosene but reacts violently with
water and an explosion ensued injuring plaintiff, who was allowed to recover.
The judgment for the defendant in Fedor v. Albert, Iio N. J. L. 493, 166 Atl.
191 (933), can be justified only upon the plaintiff's failure to prove the falsity of
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disease dangerous to persons as well as animals, sold it with the repre-
sentation that the horse "was suffering from nothing worse than a bad
cold". The purchaser's brother cared for the horse, contracted glanders
and died. The court recognized that this was active negligence by the
vendor but held that the declaration was insufficient in its factual aver-
ments and sustained the defendant's demurrer, though with leave to
amend the declaration.
CONSCIOUS MISREPRESENTATION OF SOURCE
A different type of conscious misrepresentation is a representation
by the vendor that he is the manufacturer or packer of the article sold.
This is generally accomplished by putting the vendor's name or trade-
mark, or both, on the article without a clear designation that he is
merely the vendor. In this situation the cases unanimously hold that
the vendor assumes the manufacturer's liability and if, due to negligent
manufacture, the article is dangerously defective, the vendor is liable
for harm caused thereby, regardless of whether he knew, or could have
known, of the defect. This is a quite recent development in the law
and the rule is generally considered to have originated in Thornhill v.
Carpenter-Morton Co.39 Actually the rule had been announced two
years earlier by the New York Court of Appeals.40  In 1929 The
American Law Institute used the Thornhill case as the basis of its
Tentative Section 270.41 The only reason advanced in the Thornhill
case to support the decision was that the defendant's representation
that it was the manufacturer "must be taken as essentially true". The
comment in the Restatement gives as a reason that "By putting a
chattel out as his own product, he causes it to be used in reliance upon
his care in making it." 42 This does not appear to have been a factor
in either of the cases extant when that statement was written. The
Restatement comment also says, "The rule . . . applies only where
the chattel is so put out as to lead those who use it to believe that it is
the product of him who puts it out." 43
the representation that the boiler which exploded had been tested by defendant, and
upon other defects in plaintiff's evidence.
39. 220 Mass. 593, io8 N. E. 474 (1915) (inflammable floor stain sold in cans
labelled with defendant's name as manufacturer).
40. Willson v. Faxon, 208 N. Y. io8, ioi N. E. 799 (1913). Defendant, a retail
druggist, sold plaintiff a box of "Kascara Kathartics" containing an injurious com-
pound. They were made by a very reputable firm in Boston but carried the defend-
ant's name as maker.
41. RESTATEmENT, TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1929). This has become Section
400 in the final published Restatement.
42. R ESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §400, comment c.
43. Id., comment d. The comment continues: "The fact that the chattel is sold
under the name of the person selling it may be sufficient to induce such a belief, but
this is not always so, as whwre the goods are marked as made for the seller, without
stating the name of the inaker, or where the seller is known to carry on only a retail
business." (Italics added.)
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Subsequent cases are interesting as they seem to be expanding the
application of the rule. In Burkhardt v. Armour & Co. 44 the can was
marked "Armour's Veribest Products Corned Beef", and in small type
"Armour & Co. foreign distributors". The court approved the Restate-
ment rule and said "The principle of estoppel appears to afford the
main basis and reason for the liability . . . but it seems that addi-
tional justification may be found in the consideration . . . that the
ultimate purchaser has no available means of ascertaining the actual
manufacturer or packer." 4 The court needed the "additional justifica-
tion" on the facts, which showed that the purchaser did not rely on
defendant's name or trademark but merely asked his grocer for a can
of corned beef. In Slavin v. Leggett & Co.46 the can of peas bore the
label "Francis H. Leggett & Co., Distributors" and its trade-mark
"Premier". The court referred to the earlier cases, and held it to be a
jury question whether the label was misleading and affirmed the plain-
tiff's judgment. The same year the Supreme Court of Mississippi
held the vendor 47 liable for harm resulting from packaged cheese in
wrappers bearing the vendor's name and trademark, following the
Restatement and the above cases. 48  The latest case is Armour & Co.
v. Leasure,49 where the can, bought at a retail grocery store, was
labeled with the Armour trademark, the words "Packed for Armour
& Co., Chicago, Ill., U. S. A." and the name of the Brazilian packer.
These facts seem to take the case out of the scope of the Restatement
rule, yet the court, without discussion, held it to be applicable and
affirmed judgment for the plaintiff. Can it be said that a vendor puts
a thing out "as his own product" when it is stated to be "packed for"
him and the name of the packer is given? For the plaintiff it may be
answered that purchasers seldom read labels but often do rely on a
well known trademark, such as the nationally advertised Armour trade-
marks, and advertisers spend large sums to induce such reliance. In-
deed, on the can involved in this case the label read "The name
'Armour's Star' is your guarantee of purity and wholesomeness". It
does not shock the writer's sense of justice to ask the vendor who
44. 115 Conn. 249, 161 Atl. 385 (932).
45. Id. at 265, I6I Atl. at 391. The unnamed packer was in Argentina.
46. 114 N. J. L. 421, 177 Atl. 12o (i935).
47. Here, as in most of these cases, the defendant was not the retailer, but a
wholesale distributor.
48. Swift & Co. v. Hawkins, 174 Miss. 253, 164 So. 231 (1935); accord, Dow
Drug Co. v. Nieman, 57 Ohio App. 190, 13 N. E. (2d) 130 (1936), in which defendant
wholesaler sold cigars in box marked "Title and design owned by (defendant) Co.".
In Cone v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp., 178 Miss. 816, 174 So. 554 (i937),
plaintiff was injured by fertilizer containing sulphuric acid. The defendant did not
make the fertilizer but distributed it in the original sacks which were labelled "Sold
by Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp.". In holding for the defendant no reference
was made to the Restatement rule which the court had accepted two years earlier.
49. 177 Md. 393, 9 A. (2d) 572 (1939).
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voluntarily, because he finds it beneficial to do so, affixes his name or
trademark to a product, to stand back of it as his own and bear the
burdens as well as enjoy the benefits which the conferring of one's
name upon another, normally entails. In this type of misrepresentation
there is no element of fraud nor can the representation be defined as
a negligent act. It seems rather that the person who was happy to
adopt the "child" should not attempt to disown him when he causes
trouble.
RECKLESS MISREPRESENTATION OF CHATTEL'S SAFETY
Where a vendor represents a chattel to be safe and does not have
actual knowledge that it is dangerously defective a slightly different
problem is presented. So far as the law of deceit is concerned the
vendor who represents a chattel to be safe when he knows that he
does not know whether or not it is safe, and has no firm belief that
It is, is guilty of a conscious misrepresentation. ° As to the law of
negligence he can foresee that his assurance of safety is at least a
deterrent to any investigation by the purchaser and that if the chattel
should be dangerously defective the act of representing the contrary
does create an unreasonable risk of harm. There is no social utility
in reckless and untrue statements. Where the vendor does not have
an actual belief that the chattel he represents as safe, or as free from
hidden defects, is so, and knows that if defective it will be dangerous,
particularly in the hands of a purchaser who has been lulled into a
feeling of security by the vendor's positive statement, he is guilty of
an act of negligence when he delivers the chattel with such a misrep-
resentation. A man who knows he does not know the facts, or who
knows that his data are an insufficient basis for any reasonable belief
as to what the facts are, can often foresee that his going ahead without
further investigation may be fraught with peril. For example, assume
that Rip Van Winkle was a reasonable man, prolong his sleep to I94O,
and deposit him in Times Square, New York City. When he awoke
he would be unaware of many of the normal perils of present life, yet
he would realize that if he acted without some investigating first, he
would be acting negligently.5 1 More familiar examples are the many
cases involving persons who walk into unfamiliar dark places without
ascertaining whether hidden dangers are present, and involving motor-
ists who drive blindly into fog or darkness not pierced by the car's
headlights.52 A vendor who sells rope for scaffolding and who pur-
So. Peek v. Derry, 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 526,
comment e.
5I. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 289, comment j.
52. Many Pennsylvania cases are cited in RESTATE-MENT, TORTS, PENNA. ANNOT.
(934) § 289, comment j.
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chases a supply from an unknown, itinerant peddler is in the same
position. He can foresee that his sale of the rope to a house painter,
with the representation it is safe, may be very dangerous if the rope is
defective; and he has no reasonable grounds to believe it is not. The
representation that the rope is sound is a reckless statement and a
dangerous act under the circumstances.
It is important that cases dealing with this type of act should not
be misunderstood and used as authority to impose liability upon a
vendor whose conduct falls into a different category. There are several
of these cases. A striking example is a recent case in the Manchester
Michaelmas Assizes 53 in which the plaintiff, a customer of a hair-
dresser, was injured by excessive chromic acid solution in a hair dye
lotion sold to the latter by defendants, and obtained by them from
the maker. In holding the defendants liable Judge Stable said, "They
were, in essence, dealing with a gentleman who had emerged quite
unexpectedly from Spain. . . . They never saw where (the dye)
was manufactured. They took no steps to ascertain under what sort
of supervision the manufacturing was carried on. When deliveries
were made, no test of any sort, kind or description was made.
Last . . . this commodity of which they knew singularly little .
was put out to the trade . . . as being the hair dye which . . . was
absolutely safe and harmless, . . . and positively needed no pre-
liminary tests." 54 The court also pointed out that the defendant's
own circular recognized that many hair dyes are dangerous. In view
of these facts the court's further statement that while the defendants
were negligent there was no evidence of fraud is surprising. The
statements seem clearly to be fraudulent, as reckless statements, within
Lord Herschell's famous definition in Peek v. Derry.
5 5
In other cases the facts are not so clear but they appear to be
instances of the same class. In Pearlman v. Garrod Shoe Co.56 the
vendor represented "that the shoes which it sold marked the latest step
in the progress of shoe making and embodied every proven principle
of health, of fit and of orthopedic design". These representations
were made to the purchaser who was assured that her purchase was
" 'perfect shoes for perfect feet' and that the fit was perfect". Actually
the shoes sold varied from standard orthopedic design and the lining
was "loose, bunched and creased". As a result a blister developed on
the toe of the wearer which became infected and caused death. The
53. Watson v. Buckley 11940] i All E. R. 174.
54. Id. at 181.
55. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). Fraudulent also under Judge Cardozo's definition
in Ultranares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N. Y. 170, 179, 174 N. E. 441,
449 (i93i).
56. 276 N. Y. 172, x N. E. (2d) 718 (1937).
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court said, without discussion, "Under the pleadings and proof, plain-
tiff may recover on the ground of negligence irrespective of con-
tract." 57 The decision should be limited to its facts.58  Penny Co. v.
Morris 59 was a case where the plaintiff in the course of purchasing
shoes from defendant pointed out that the heel looked defective, as in
fact it was and later caused the plaintiff to fall. According to the
plaintiff the defendant "said there was not any danger of that heel,
• and the man being in business like that as long as he was, I
took his word for it and bought the shoes, and he said 'I will guarantee
you that heel will not come off' ".60 This was certainly a reckless
statement after the plaintiff had pointed out the condition of the shoe.
Similarly, in Cunningham v. Pease House Furnishing Co.61 the de-
fendant, in answering an inquiry about the use of a new stove blacking
purchased from it said "the warmer the stove the better it works".
When used on a hot stove the blacking exploded. 2  In King Hard-
ware Co. v. Ennis 63 the defendant sold a gasoline stove, containing
a leaky feed pipe, and "assured (plaintiff) that it was impossible for
said stove to explode". Fumes from the leak did explode. In over-
ruling the defendant's demurrer the court said: "It certainly could not
be held that they were without a duty of discovering the defect when
they assumed to represent that the stove was safe and could not explode.
If a person is without knowledge as to whether a particular thing is true
or not, he ordinarily will act at his peril in representing it to be true." 64
57. Id. at 177, II N. E. (2d) at 719.
58. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate the court thought that a vendor
is under a general duty to inspect. Any such interpretation finds no support in the
authorities cited by the court, namely RESTATEIExT, TORTS (1934) §§398, 399, 401,
402, and Bourchiex v. Willow Brook Dairy, 268 N. Y. 1, 196 N. E. 617 (1935). The
Bourchiex case involved the liability of a dairy which had allowed broken glass to
get into milk bottled, as well as sold, by it. Section 398 deals with the liability of a
manufacturer, Section 399 with liability for a known dangerous chattel and Sections
401 and 402 with narrowly limited types of cases discussed hereafter.
59. 173 Miss. 710, 163 So. 124 (1935).
6o.'Id. at 714, 163 So. at 124. The court relied on RFSTATmENT, TORTS (1934)
§ 401, discussed hereafter.
61. 74 N. H. 435, 69 Atl. 120 (19o8).
62. The court said: "The test, therefore, . . . is to inquire whether the ordinary
man, having no more knowledge of the situation and its dangers than the defendants
are shown to have had, would have told the plaintiff it was safe to use the blacking
on a hot stove." Id. at 438, 69 Atl. at 121.
63. 39 Ga. App. 355, 147 S. E. 119 (1929).
64. Id. at 363, 147 S. E. at 123. (Italics added.) The court cited, inter alia, the
Cunningham case, upra, and continued: "Thus, if a dealer, in placing upon the mar-
ket an article which is manufactured by another, is without knowledge as to whether
it be sound, or, on the contrary, defective, he should stand where the law places him
and pass the article on, upon the assumption, without nore, that the manufacturer has
performed the duty of properly constructing the article and of making it safe for the
common use intended." Ibid. (Italics added.) In Segal v. Carroll Furniture Co., 51
Ga. App. 164, 179 S. E. 775 (935), the defective bed was not only sold by defendant
but also installed by it and expressly warranted to be "extra strong". In addition the
question was raised on a demurrer to the declaration, and courts today are loath to
put plaintiffs in personal injury cases out of court on the pleadings. In Smith v.
Clark Hardware Co., loo Ga. 163, 28 S. E. 73 (1897), the plaintiff asked defendant
vendor for a .38 calibre Winchester rifle cartridge and was given a different size and
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In all of these cases the defendant, on the basis of the data he
had, acted in a foreseeably dangerous, and unreasonably dangerous,
manner. It is submitted that no one of them is authority for a rule
imposing any general duty of inspection upon a vendor. Rather, each
case contained a positive assurance of safety by the vendor. Such an
assurance is quite different from a statement by a vendor that he
"guarantees the appliance against defects in manufacture for a period
of one year and will replace free, any part which an examination by
the vendor shall disclose to be defective". 65 This is not an assurance
of safety. It is, on the contrary, a recognition that the chattel may
contain defects and an assurance that if it does the vendor will remedy
the defect without further expense to the purchaser. Such a case falls
into a wholly different class.
HONEST MISREPRESENTATION OF CHATTEL'S SAFETY
The next type of case is where the vendor does actually have a
firm belief that the chattel he sells is safe. This is generally the case
where the chattel is not normally dangerous and will become so only
if it is defective. The vendor may well have such a belief without
having himself inspected the chattel. For example take the case of
the vendor who has obtained the chattel from a reputable source of
supply and his prior orders have been uniformly free of defective
chattels; add the fact that the manufacturer's literature and salesmen
have educated the vendor to believe in the efficacy of the meticulous
precautions the manufacturer usually takes to put out a perfect product
(as in the case of modern automobile manufacturers). On such facts
it may be said that the vendor has a firm conviction 66 he is speaking
the truth when he represents to a customer that the chattel sold is safe.
Such a statement, false though it turns out to be, is not fraudulent
under the rule in Peek v. Derry.67 Nor can it be established that such
make cartridge, though quite similar, which, because of the difference in size, ex-
ploded in plaintiff's gun. (This is one type of negligent act, just as the giving of.
poisonous boiled linseed oil for harmless raw linseed oil in Wright v. Howe, 46 Utah
588, i5o Pac. 956 (I915), was a type of negligent act.) In view of these Georgia
cases, and ordinary rules of negligence, the judgment of non-suit in Robbins v.
Georgia Power Co., 47 Ga. App. 517, 171 S. E. 218 (1933) seems incredible. Plain-
tiff, as defendant knew, had just had a surgical operation. Defendant sold plaintiff
a fat reducing vibrating machine, assuring her that its use would be beneficial and
that "she could use the machine for ten minutes at a time . . . at its highest rate
of speed". Such use displaced plaintiff's kidney. Only a syllabus opinion, which may
not give a complete picture, is reported.
65. As in Ebbert v. Phila. Electric Co., 126 Pa. Super. 351, 191 Atl. 384 (937),
aff'd, 330 Pa. 257, 259, 198 Atl. 323, 325 (1938), discussed hereafter.
66. See the analysis of "conviction", "belief" and "knowledge" in RE STATEFT,
TORTS (934) § 289, comment d.
67. 14 App. Cas. 337 (i889). This rule prevails in many American jurisdic-
tions and is accepted in the RESTATE ENT, TORTS (1934) § 526. A number of states
permit an action of deceit to be based on even innocent misrepresentations, thus giving
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a representation is a negligent act.68 People act reasonably in doing
many things upon the assumption that certain facts exist even though
they have not personally investigated the evidence, and know the
"facts" only as hearsay. Indeed only a tiny fraction of what a person
regards as his "knowledge" is based upon personal investigation. By
far the greater part of it is obtained from "sources believed to be
reliable". Life would become intolerable if we were permitted to act
only upon facts disclosed by personal investigation. As to many things
we are incompetent to form a reliable conclusion even if we do ex-
amine the evidence. Every day we engage in activities which we
reasonably believe to be safe because we assume certain facts to exist,
and believe they exist, and yet know that if the facts do not exist the
activity will be highly dangerous. That is true, for example, of every
driver of a new automobile, of every person who fires a new rifle.
Every day all of us constantly make "factual" statements about matters
on which we have no more than second hand information. Conse-
quently a vendor's honest representation that a chattel is free of defects,
when based upon reliable past experience, cannot be branded as a
negligent act merely because the vendor has not personally investigated
the chattel. Such a representation is in accord with practically universal
human conduct.
Two comparatively recent cases illustrate this point. In State
to use v. Consolidated Gas, E. L. & P. Co.0 9 the defendant demurred
to a declaration which averred that he sold to plaintiff a defective gas
heater which emitted carbon monoxide fumes, killing plaintiff's son,
and that defendant had represented that the heater could be used with
perfect safety. In sustaining the demurrer the court held that the
vendor had no duty to inspect and pointed out that it sold the heater
"in the same condition as received from its vendor, and there is no
allegation of any knowledge on its part that same was not perfectly
safe, nor any allegation that the article was purchased from an irre-
sponsible or incompetent manufacturer".70 In Camden Fire Ins. Co.
v. Peterman 7 1 the defendant sold a gasoline stove containing a de-
fective control valve which would not shut off the flame, and the cus-
such representations the effect of a warranty. See Bohlen, Misrepresentation as De-
ceit, Negligence, or Warranty (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 733. But in all of these
cases the action has been by the purchaser against the vendor to recover the pecuniary
loss caused by the chattel or land being of less value than represented.
68. The limit of liability for a "Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk of
Bodily Harm" is stated in RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 311, and the rule applies
only to "one a part of whose business or profession it is to give information upon
which the bodily security of others depends and who in his business or professional
capacity gives false information . . . ," such as a boiler inspection company or a
physician. Cf. § 552, comment c.
69. 146 Md. 390, 126 AtI. 1o5 (1924).
70. 146 Md. 390, 398, 126 Atl. 105, 1O8 (1924).
71. 278 Mich. 65, 270 N. W. 807 (1937).
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tomer's property was destroyed by fire the first time the stove was
lighted. In fact the vendor's own employee had lighted the stove. It
had been received from a reputable manufacturer, uncrated in vendor's
store and delivered without any inspection, and with the representation
that it was "fool proof". The Supreme Court of Michigan held the
vendor was not liable.
72
INNOCENT DELIVERY WITHOUT AN ExPREss REPRESENTATION
The next type of situation is where the vendor delivers a chattel
without saying anything about its condition and honestly believes it to
be harmless for any use for which it is designed. This can happen
only when the chattel is normally free of danger. If the chattel is of
a type which is dangerous even when perfect, the vendor is almost
certain to have knowledge of that fact and if the purchaser is likely
to be ignorant of it, the vendor can well foresee that a delivery without
warning of the normal danger is a dangerous act. On the other hand
if the vendor reasonably believes the normal dangers of using the
chattel are known to the purchaser there is no need to call attention
72. In Shroder v. Barron-Dady Motor Co., iii S. W. (2d) 66 (Mo. 1937), the
defendant was a local dealer for Graham automobiles. It delivered a car to a pro-
spective customer for him to try out with the representation that it was "in perfect
condition". While the plaintiff was using the car, grease leaked out from inside a
wheel, affected the brake bands, and an accident resulted. In fact, the defendant had
tested the brakes and they were working properly when the car was delivered. In
an opinion directing judgment for the defendant the court said, quoting from 24 R. C.
L. 509: "The distinction between the liability of the manufacturer and the liability of the
seller consists in this: the seller is under no obligation to test articles manufactured or
packed by others for the purpose of discovering latent or hidden dangers." Id. at 70.
It also said, "It is true, of course, that defendant, receiving new cars from the man-
ufacturer, had some duty of inspection, before selling them, . . . Its duty as to
inspection, because of exclusive selling rights in certain territory . . . would no
doubt be greater than that of an ordinary retail merchant in the examination of less
complicated articles of merchandise. This duty would undoubtedly require them to
observe the cars as they received and operated them to see if they did operate prop:
erly, to investigate the cause of any unusual condition apparent to them, and also to
investigate the condition of and check the operation of parts or appliances, which
they might reasonably expect (as a result of their experience and knowledge of these
cars) would need attention before being delivered to purchasers." Id. at 71.
This can well be justified by the fact, known to every car purchaser, that cars
are not ready for delivery when received by the dealer. He regularly does consid-
erable work, such as oiling, greasing, adjusting brakes and other parts, before ap-
proving the car for delivery. He knows that until this work is done and some final
check-up is made the car is not ready for operation.
Much less tenable is the distinction between a wholesale distributor and a retailer
announced in Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N. E. (2d) 25o (1938). The
wholesaler is, if anything, even more of a conduit than the retailer. In the other
cases involving wholesalers there is no suggestion that they owe a greater duty than
do retailers. In the Sicard case the plaintiff was injured by a deleterious hair dye,
apparently sold by defendant distributor in the original package. The court says the
defendant represented the dye to be "safe and proper in every respect". In fact, the
circular, as quoted in the opinion, says nothing about safety. The court, relying on
cases involving manufacturers, held the defendant liable. The decision seems wrong
unless it can be defended on the ground that as the defendant had practically the
same name as the manufacturer it appeared to be such and should be held liable under
the rule in RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 400, already discussed. But this was not
the basis for the decision as announced by the court.
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to them. 73 For reasons already advanced the delivery of a chattel
normally harmless, not known to be defective and honestly believed
to be perfect, is not a negligent act. Foreseeable risk of harm is deter-
mined by the actor's reasonable belief as to what the facts are.
7 4 In
any ordinary case a reasonable man would not believe it necessary to
investigate before acting. There may be a rare and exceptional situa-
tion where a defect will cause a catastrophe and even an off chance
that the chattel may be defective is such as to demand some looking
into by the vendor. But such cases will be few and far between.
Ordinarily, if a vendor is held liable for selling a chattel without
inspection, liability is being imposed not because he did a foreseeably
dangerous act but because he omitted to do something. In other words
an affirmative duty to act is being imposed.75 Generally, affirmative
obligations are imposed only as the price of a benefit.
76 If it be said
that the vendor benefits from the sale of a chattel, it may also be said
that the primary benefit of using the chattel accrues to the purchaser.
If that use benefit is not strong enough to raise a duty of inspection
by the purchaser, why should the sale benefit be sufficient to raise a
duty of inspection by the vendor? If the ptirchaser's belief that the
chattel is free from defects is reasonable, so that his use without inspec-
tion is not negligent as to a third person or contributory negligence as
to himself, how can it be said that the vendor's equally reasonable
belief and sale without inspection is negligence? After all, the risk of
harm is to the purchaser, not to the vendor. It is doubtful (at least,
in the absence of a positive statement by the vendor) if it can be
answered that the purchaser relies on the vendor. Occasionally that
may be true of a purchaser dealing with a great metropolitan store.
But even there, in this age of national advertising and familiar trade-
marks, the purchaser is equally likely to rely on the manufacturer.
The man who is contemplating purchasing an automobile pays far
more attention to who the manufacturer is than to the identity of the
73. Rogers v. Kresge Co., 23 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 448 (192I), and Crandall v.
Stop & Shop, Inc., 288 Ill. App. 543, b N. E. (2d) 685 (937), appear to be such cases.
74. . . . circumstances which exist at the time of his action or inaction, but
of which the actor neither knows nor should know, although known to third persons"
are "immaterial". RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 282, comment g.
75. The "omission to do something" as being negligence, under Baron Alderson's
definition in Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works, ii Ex. 781 (1856), is not accurate
as a general rule. An affirmative duty to act is limited to certain relationships:
BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 33, 42-46, 62-64. Even knowledge
that action is necessary to prevent harm is not, in itself, enough to create a duty to
act: RESTATEMiENT, TORTS § 314. Although in recent years it has become fashionable
in certain circles to deny there is any distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance,
and in some situations the lines draw close, there still remains a fundamental differ-
ence between the act of pushing a man into a well and the omission of a bystander
to pull him out.
76. E. g., the possessor of land owes a duty to a business visitor to inspect, but
only owes to other licensees a duty to warn of known defects: RESTATEmENT, TORTS
(1934) §§ 342, comment c, and 343, comment a.
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local dealer. In the case of the small store the purchaser generally
trusts to his own judgment. In considering whether a retailer should
have a duty to inspect it must not be overlooked that the rule will apply
to the individual owner of the small town hardware store who is
proprietor, clerk, and bookkeeper (and who will find suing the manu-
facturer just as inconvenient as it is for his customer) as well as to a
store like John Wanamaker or Marshall Field.
Because of these reasons and until quite recently, it has generally
been thought that a vendor had no duty of inspection; and that he was
not liable (in the absence of a warranty) for harm caused by a defect
where he did not know it existed or was not possessed of information,
which should have made him suspicious. Writing in 1905 Professor
Bohlen said: "But the vendor is not bound to inspect the articles which
he sells in order to discover any possible defects which may unfit them
for use." 77 Similar statements appear in Ruling Case Law 78 and
Corpus Juris 79 and have been repeatedly cited or quoted with approval
by the courts. Also there is a considerable body of case law in which
vendors who did not inspect chattels which, by reason of hidden de-
fects, caused harm, have been absolved from liability. In a number of
these cases the defect was not detectable by an ocular inspection and
could have been disclosed only by thorough testing. 0 As to these
cases it may be said that the vendor could not have discovered the
defect even if he had used "reasonable care" in inspecting them.81
77. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS, (1926) 67, io5.
78. "The dealer who purchases and sells an article in common and general use
in the usual course of trade and business, without knowledge of its dangerous quali-
ties, is not under a duty to exercise ordinary care to discover whether it is dangerous
or not. He may take it as he finds it on the market. He is not required to investi-
gate its qualities, or endeavor to ascertain whether it is dangerous for the use in-
tended before he can absolve himself from liability in the event injury results from
its use." 24 R. C. L. 5op-io.
79. 45 C. J. 893.
8o. S. K. Kress & Co. v. Lindsey, 262 Fed. 331 (C. C. A. 5th, I919) (anthrax
bacillus in shaving brush); Noble v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 12 F. Supp. 181 (W. D.
Wash. 1935) (structurally weak steam cooker) ; Tourte v. Horton Mfg. Co., io8 Cal.
App. 22, 290 Pac. 919 (1930) (washing machine wringer); Stone v. Van Noy R. R.
News Co., 153 Ky. 240, 154 S. W. 1092 (1913) (weak soda pop bottle); Peaslee-
Gaulbert Co. v. McMath's Adm'r, 148 Ky. 265, 146 S. W. 770 (1912) (explosive
paint dryer) ; Boyd v. J. C. Penney Co., 195 So. 87 (La. App. 1940) (deleterious chem-
ical in dress) ; Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, IOO Atl. 510 (1916) (wood alcohol
in whiskey) ; Giberti v. James Barrett Mfg. Co., 266 Mass. 70, 165 N. E. i (1929)
(structurally weak boiler); Pitman v Lynn G. & E. Co., 241 Mass. 322, 135 N. E.
223 (1922) (defective gas flatiron not discovered by defendant's inspection); Bar-
rango v. Hinckley Rendering Co., 230 Mass. 93, 119 N. E. 746 (igi8) (needle in
soap) ; Kusick v. Thorndike & Hix, 224 Mass. 413, 112 N. E. 1O25 (igi6) (explosive
canned lime) ; Clement v. Rommeck, 149 Mich. 595, 113 N. W. 286 (1907) (inflam-
mable stove polish) ; Isbell v. Biederman Furniture Co., 115 S. W. (2d) 46 (Mo. App.
1938) (defective bed) ; Bruckel v. Milhau's Son, 116 App. Div. 832, 1O2 N. Y. Supp.
395 (2d Dep't 1907) (weak seltzer bottle); Checchio v. S. Goldman Sons, 8 Pa.
D. & C. I (1926) (poisonous substance in shoe leather) ; Belcher v. Goff Bros., 145
Va. 448, 134 S. E. 588 (1926) (gasoline in kerosene) ; Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co.,
139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157 (19o9) (needle in soap).
81. However, in seven of them (Peaslee-Gaulbert v. McGrath's Adn'r, Belcher
v. Goff, Checchio v. Goldman, Tourte v. Horton, Noble v. Sears Roebuck, Isbell v.
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Probably the same thought is partly behind the rule that a vendor who
sells goods "in the original package" is not liable for harm caused by
them. 2 It would seem that this rule is based also upon the idea that
ordinarily such a vendor neither knows nor from facts in his possession
has reason to know that the article is dangerous. In this age of cello-
phane wrappers a sale in an original package would not protect the
vendor who sees the defect, just as the sale of chlorinated lime in the
original package in Clarke v. Army & Navy Co-operative Society,
Ltd.s8 did not protect the vendor who had been warned by other pur-
chasers of cans out of the same lot that they were dangerous. In two
cases involving observable defects but in which the vendor did not
inspect and learn of them, he was held not to have any such duty.
4
In Miller v. Svensson 15 the vendor had made an inspection, apparently
cursory, of a fur coat which had a furrier's knife concealed in the
lining and it cut the purchaser. Liability was denied, the court saying
"defendants were not bound to anticipate and search for that which
was unusual and unforeseen" s.8
In fact when the rules relating to a vendor were drafted by Pro-
fessor Bohlen and his advisory group for The American Law Institute
in 1929 and 1930, there was not a single decision by a court of last
resort in England or America which had held a vendor, who neither
knew of the defect nor had made reckless statements about the chattel's
safety, liable for physical harm to person or property caused by a
defective chattel. In presenting the draft 87 to the Institute in May
1930 Professor Bohlen had only this to say of the four sections 88 of
the Restatement of Torts dealing with a vendor: "I don't think there
is any doubt about it that if I buy a chattel from a reputable manufac-
turer I may sell without subjecting it to any extended investigation
Biedernman, and Boyd v. Penney) the court flatly said that the vendor's duty did not
extend beyond revealing known defects. In some of the others the court used lan-
guage to the effect that the vendor neither "knew nor by the exercise of ordinary care
could have known" of the defect. It is difficult to determine what importance should
be attached to such wording. It may be that the court was merely stating the case
most favorably to the plaintiff and holding, even then, that he had no case. On the
other hand, it is possible to argue that the language implies some duty of inspection.
However, courts frequently use language without the precision of meaning with which
"should know" is defined in RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 12, and distinguished from
"reason to know".
82. Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Brown, io7 F. (2d) 938 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ("ardena
bronze") ; Cone v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp., 178 Miss. 816, I74 So. 554
(1937) (fertilizer) ; McMurray v. Vaughn's Seed Store, 117 Ohio St. 236, 157 N. E.
567 (1927) (fertilizer); West v. Emanuel, 198 Pa. 18o, 47 Ati. 965 (1goi) (head-
ache powder); see Howes v. Rose, 13 Ind. App. 674, 678, 42 N. E. 303, 304 (1895).
83. [1903] I K. B. 155, cited note 25 supra.
84. Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 Ex. 761 (185) (leading case, involving cracked and
leaky lamp); Moore v. Jefferson D. & D. Co., 169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (i93o) (oil
drums containing alcohol).
85. 189 Ill. App. 355 (1914).
86. Id. at 356.
87. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 5 1930).
88. §§ 269-272 in the Tentative Draft which are now §§ 399-402.
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unless there is some reason to suppose it is defective. I do not know
whether there may or may not be chattels so dangerous that even a
retailer would be under a duty of carefully checking up." 89
THE RESTATEMENT
In view of this background and of the fact that the function of
The American Law Institute is limited to a restatement of the existing
law the scope of Sections 4oi and 402 merit examination. The first
says:
"A vendor of a chattel made by a third person which is
bought as safe for use in reliance upon the vendor's profession
of competence and care is subject to liability for bodily harm
caused by the vendor's failure to exercise reasonable competence
and care to supply the chattel in a condition safe for use."
The extent of and the limitations on the application of this rule are
explained in the comments. With respect to goods in their original
packages the comment says "the retailer is not subject to liability for
bodily harm.caused by their defective condition, unless the condition
is such that even the cursory inspection which a dealer should make
of any article which he puts in stock and sells, would disclose some
indication that the goods had deteriorated to a dangerous extent." If
this means no more than that the vendor of canned goods, for example,
is liable when the defect has swollen the can to produce an obvious
bulge, there can be no real objection because it is practically certain
the bulge will be seen and that fact is a danger signal to the vendor.90
A broader interpretation, involving a duty to seek defects in goods in
original packages, has no authority to support it. The comment con-
tinues, "if the purchaser depends upon the recommendation of the
retailer, he is entitled to expect that the retailer will know something
of the manufacturer of the goods he sells and will not recommend
goods made by a manufacturer whom the retailer, by reputation or
previous experience with his products, should know to be careless or
incompetent". That relates to a case where the retailer either has
knowledge or suspicions that the goods are defective and his representa-
tion to the contrary is a fraudulent or reckless act. The comment
adds: "So, too, one who buys goods which a retailer has kept in storage
and which are likely to become deteriorated to the danger point unless
89. (193o) 8 PRoc. A. L. I. 239.
go. The writer was not appointed an adviser on Torts to the Institute until after
these sections were completed. Hence he is unfamiliar with the discussions about
them in the conferences. In any event the meaning of the sections must be ascer-
tained from their wording, keeping in mind that it is to be assumed the Institute
did not intend to go farther than justified by existing authority.
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properly kept, is entitled to expect that the retailer will exercise both
competence and care in their keeping." This is made even clearer by
the illustration that a purchaser of meat "is entitled to expect that the
retailer has not kept it in close contact with any substance which will
render it unfit for consumption". That, too, is clear. Putting meat
close to something which will spoil it is a negligent act similar to
putting the rat poison close to the flour bin, as in Heineinann v. Bar-
field.91 It involves no duty of inspection. As worded, the comment,
in its application to the purchaser, is a specific application of the rule
that in some situations one is entitled to assume that another will not
act negligently, 2 which frequently finds judicial expression in cases of
automobile accidents.
The comment then says that where the selection of an article is
left to the retailer "the purchaser is entitled to expect that the retailer
will exercise reasonable care to select from his stock articles fit for the
purpose for which they are bought". This also deals with negligent
acts, as, in Wright v. Howe,93 where the purchaser told the retailer
he wanted linseed oil as medicine for a horse an d the retailer carelessly
gave him poisonous boiled linseed oil instead of wholesome raw linseed
oil. No question of duty to inspect is involved. It is like the case of
a druggist who is told the purchaser desires something for a cough
and who carelessly selects from his stock a poison instead of a cough
medicine.
9 4
The final situation referred to in the comment is the sale of an
article "which is dangerous for use unless its character and properties
are disclosed" in which case "the retailer must exercise reasonable care
to make its character and properties known to the purchaser". This
relates to a non-defective article of a "character" which makes it
normally dangerous for use unless the user is aware of its "character
and properties". A retailer knows the normal "character" of articles
sold by him. Handing over a known dangerous chattel to a person
unfamiliar with its dangerous "properties" without warning him of
them is active negligence. An example would be handing a person a
known loaded, cocked gun without informing him of those facts. No
question of inspection is involved and liability does not depend on any
finding that the defendant is a vendor.
It is therefore clear that this section, as explained in the com-
ments, does not impose any duty of inspection upon a vendor where
91. 136 Ark. 456, 207 S. W. 58 (9i8), cited note 33 supra.
92. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 290, comment b.
93. 46 Utah 588, 150 Pac. 956 (1915), cited note 32 supra.
94. Cf. Beckwith v. Oatman, 43 Hun 265 (N. Y. 1887), which is cited in RE-
STATEMENT, TORTS, EXPLANATORY NOTES (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1930) 37 in support of the
section.
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he has no reason to believe the goods are dangerously defective. In-
deed the absence of any such duty is thus expressly stated in the
explanatory note to the Tentative Draft of this section: "A vendor
is not under obligation to inspect goods bought of a reputable manu-
facturer in order to ascertain whether they are fit for the purpose for
which they are sold." 9' The wording of the blackletter does not
define what is meant by "failure to exercise reasonable competence
and care", and the meaning must be gleaned from the comments. But
the use of the word "failure" is misleading and unfortunate.96 The
vendor is really being held not for his "failure" to act but for doing an
act which, on the knowledge he had, was an unreasonably dangerous act.
The other Restatement section (402) requires equally close
scrutiny. It says:
"A vendor of a chattel manufactured by a third person is
subject to liability as stated in Section 399,97 if, although he is
ignorant of the dangerous character or condition of the chattel,
he could have discovered it by exercising reasonable care to utilize
the peculiar opportunity and competence which as a dealer in such
chattels he has or should have."
The critical words are "by exercising reasonable care" and the question
is when does the exercise of "reasonable care" require the vendor to
inspect? The answer must be found in the authority which is being
restated and in the comments to the section.
One of the two cases cited in the explanatory note to this sec-
tion 98 involved a vendor who neither knew nor could have known of
the structural defect in a boiler.9 In holding that a directed verdict
for defendant was proper the court said: "Unless the defendant knew,
or ought to have known, that boilers soldered but not riveted together
were unsafe, it could not be found to be negligent in supplying
them." 100 Consideration has already been given to what weight the
9S. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, EXPLANATORY- NoTEs (Tent. Draft No. 5, I93O) 37,
Commentary to Section 271 (now §401).
96. It is using the word in the same way as referring to the engineer's "failure"
to blow the locomotive whistle for the grade crossing. Actually the victim's family
complains of the engineer's act of running over him and killing him. That's action!
The engineer knew that his activity carried on in this manner was dangerous.
97. Section 399 states the liability for selling a chattel known to be dangerous.
98. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, EXPLANATORY NoTsS (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1930) 38,
Commentary on Section 272 (now § 402): "See Giberti v. Barrett Mfg. Co., 165
N. E. I9 (Mass. 1929) and Karsteadt v. Gross Co., 179 Wis. HIO (1922)." This is
the entire explanatory note to the section. These notes were prepared by the Re-
porter, and it has been the practice, when the point was not well settled, to set forth in
the explanatory notes all the cases which could be found which supported the pro-
posed rule.
99. Giberti v. James Barrett Mfg. Co., 266 Mass. 70, i65 N. E. i9 (1929), cited
note 8o supra.
ioo. Id. at 73, i65 N. E. at 20.
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words "or ought to have known" carry. 1°1 Also, the soldered bottom
was a normal characteristic of all the boilers sold by the defendant and
known to him. In addition Massachusetts still clings to the law an-
nounced in the Huset case 102 which limits the vendor's liability to the
case of a known defect. In Karsteadt v. Gross Co.,'0 3 the second case
cited, the vendor knew of the danger, expressly pointed out certain
hazards to the plaintiff but did not warn of the danger in the un-
guarded gears of a washing machine. Neither of these cases holds
that a vendor has a duty to inspect.
Let us turn to the comments to Section 402, keeping in mind
Professor Bohlen's statement to the Institute, quoted above, and the
positive statement in the explanatory note to the preceding section,
denying any duty to inspect goods bought of a reputable manufacturer.
The first part of the comment says:
"A wholesale or retail dealer, who sells in the original pack-
ages goods bought from reputable manufacturers, acts as a con-
duit through which the goods pass from manufacturtrs to con-
sumer, who buys them in reliance upon the manufacturer's
reputation for competence and care. A vendor of such goods,
therefore, is under no duty to subject them to rigid inspection or
tests before selling them. He may, however, as dealer, have a
special opportunity to know of circumstances, which to his ex-
perience as dealer, would indicate that the goods are likely to have
deteriorated, as when he knows that goods, subject to deteriora-
tion by lapse of time, have been long kept in stock. If such is the
case, he is subject to the same liability as though he knew of their
defective character if he does not exercise reasonable care to in-
form the purchaser of the chance that the goods may have de-
teriorated." 104
This language does not impose any duty of inspection upon a vendor
who has no reason to believe the chattel is defective. The illustration
of "goods subject to deterioration" emphasizes that a typical case is
the sale of perishable goods. The milk dealer, for example, knows
from "his experience as dealer" that after X hours milk may turn sour,
and after X + Y hours it is sure to turn sour. He also knows he has
had his milk on hand for X hours. He is "ignorant of the dangerous
character or condition" of the milk, i. e., the fact it is sour, but he
knows that it may be. A sale of fresh meat, under like circumstances,
would, on the facts actually known to the vendor, be a foreseeably
dangerous act. Knowing what he does the vendor must either look
IO1. Note 8x mipra.
io2. Huset v. Case Threshing Co., 12o Fed. 865 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o3).
103. 179 Wis. iro, i9o N. W. 844 (1922), cited note 26 supra.
io4. Italics added.
328 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
into the matter further or put the purchaser on guard by conveying
to him the knowledge the vendor possesses. That is all.
The remainder of the comment says:
"A retail or a wholesale vendor may, in the cursory inspec-
tion which he gives to the goods while handling them for the pur-
pose of receiving and selling them, or during the periodical taking
of stock, have an opportunity to observe indications which as a
competent dealer in such commodities should cause him to realize
that the goods are or are likely to be in a condition dangerous for
use. These indications may be so slight that the vendor is not
entitled to expect that they will be observed by any inspection
which customers make or should make before buying and using
the goods. Even if the conditions are plainly observable by the
customer they may be such that, although enough to cause a com-
petent dealer to realize that they make the goods unsafe, they may
convey no such intimation to a customer having no special ex-
perience with such goods. The rule stated in this Section requires
the retail or wholesale dealer to utilize not only the special oppor-
tunities which he has to observe the condition of the goods but also
the special competence which. he, as a dealer in such goods, should
have to realize the dangerous implication of conditions which
though observable by the customer are not likely to be appreciated
by him. His failure to inform his vendees that the goods are or
are likely to be dangerous is not excused by his ignorance thereof,
if his ignorance is due to his failure to utilize his special oppor-
tunities and exercise his special competence for the purpose of
discovering whether the goods are or are not safe for the use for
which they are sold." 105
This language, also, does not impose a duty to inspect for the purpose
of discovering defects in a chattel believed to be safe. In referring to
"the cursory inspection which he gives" the comment is describing a
factual situation rather than laying down a duty to inspect. The grocer
while putting cans on his shelves "has an opportunity to observe" a
bulge in a particular can. His experience and competence tell him that
this may indicate gas inside the can, formed by deteriorated contents.
The "plainly observable" bulge carries no such message to the customer,
lacking the grocer's knowledge, gained from experience. The grocer
is "ignorant" of the condition of the food, because the bulge may also
have been formed by causes other than deterioration; but he knows
enough to arouse his suspicions. This actual knowledge flashes a
danger signal to the grocer, if not to his customer. The situation dis-
cussed in the comment is a special application of a general rule that the
act of a person possessing special knowledge, which enables him to see
1O5. Italics added.
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a risk of harm, is judged in the light of that fact although the act of
one lacking such knowledge would not be. 106 The physician who sees
a symptom which may or may not indicate a contagious disease and
who sends the patient out to mingle with people does something which
his own special knowledge tells him is unreasonably risky. A further
inspection of the patient to determine whether he has "deteriorated"
is in order. So, too, is a further inspection of the bulged can of food.
The only language which could possibly be construed to impose
any greater duty of inspection is the statement "The rule stated .
requires the wholesale or retail dealer to utilize . . . the special op-
portunities which he has to observe the condition of the goods . "
It can be argued that this requires the dealer to search for "observable"
defects. Taking the sentence in its context does not warrant such a
broad interpretation; nor does the rationale of a vendor's liability. If
the evidence of the defect is plain on the outer face of the chattel it is
practically certain the vendor did know of it. His denial will generally
be met with incredulity by the jury just as the jury views with in-
credulity the defendant's protestations of ignorance of the falsity of
his statements in a deceit action where the evidence makes such igno-
rance highly improbable. But so far as the rule of law is concerned the
test should be the vendor's actual knowledge of the defect or of facts
pointing to it, while the degree of observableness of the defect should
be merely evidence bearing upon the existence or non-existence of that
controlling fact; just as in the deceit case, under the rule of Peek v.
Derry, the controlling fact is the honesty of the defendant's belief,
while the lack of any reasonable grounds for such belief is evidence
of the fact it was not actually entertained and that the defendant,
despite his denial, knew his statement was false.
10 7
Further, the issue of the vendor's knowledge is easily understand-
able while a rule of law requiring inspection for observable defects
but not for unobservable defects draws a line very difficult of applica-
tion. Does observable mean visible to the eye from the outside? Does
it mean observable only if you look for it seeking danger, or observable
by the casual glance given in the usual unpacking and handling? 108
Does it require the removal of easily removable parts to see what is
visible underneath? Does it mean visible as you view the chattel from
a normal standing or sitting posture or visible as you get down and
look all over it? Does it mean detectable by the sense of feel, or smell,
or hearing, or taste as well as sight? Must the vendor look at, handle,
I06. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 290, comment e.
107. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1938) § 526, comment d.
io8. Many things are seen but not observed. How many people can describe the
details of even familiar objects, or state the patterns or even colors of the suits worn
by the last three persons talked to?
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smell, taste and listen to the chattel? Must he palpate the chattel inside
to feel the defect? Must he tap it with a handy hammer to hear the
defect? If an equally simple and not inconvenient test, such as using
litmus paper will make the defect observable by sight, as palpation
makes it observable by feeling, is this required?
And why stop with "observable defects"? If danger to the cus-
tomer and others imposes a duty of inspection, danger from the unob-
servable but discoverable defect is even greater because the purchaser
cannot observe it. If the presence of an unobservable defect may bring
death why not require the vendor to employ the facilities of modem
testing laboratories to discover it? Into such a maze do we get once
we depart from the rule that the vendor's liability is predicated upon
his knowledge of the danger creating defect or of other facts from
which he has reason to suspect its existence.
CASES IMPOSING DUTY TO INSPECT
A careful search has disclosed only three cases in which the courts
have held that a vendor is under some general duty of inspection.
Only one of these is by a court of last resort, and the other two are in
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York. The
earliest, decided in 191o by a divided court, is Garvey v. Namm. 109
The plaintiff purchased a 590 wrapper at a department store sale.
Unknown to either party a basting needle I or I Y4 inches long had been
left in an unfinished seam and it scratched the plaintiff when she washed
the garment. In fact the defendant had inspected these wrappers for
quality and workmanship but had not seen the needle. The majority
of the court held that the vendor had a duty of careful inspection and
allowed the plaintiff to recover."' In 194o the same court followed
this decision in Santise v. 1M1artins, Inc.,"' in which the plaintiff, while
trying on a pair of shoes in a department store, was injured by a nail
protruding from the inner sole of one of the shoes.
To say that the vendors in these cases, particularly on their facts,
were negligent seems absurd. Negligence is conduct which involves
an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm. The magnitude of the fore-
seeable risk of harm must outweigh the utility of the act containing
that risk."' What "reasonable man" would think it necessary to
inspect meticulously every one of a thousand cheap wrappers before
l09. 136 App. Div. 815, 121 N. Y. Supp. 442 (2d Dep't igoi).
no. In Miller v. Svensson, 189 Ill. App. 355 (1914) the furrier's knife in the
fur coat lining could probably have been found by feeling the coat, yet the court held
the defendant was not liable. This case seems to be squarely contrary, on its facts,
to the New York case.
III. 258 App. Div. 663, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 741 (2d Dep't 194o).
112. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§291-293.
VENDOR'S TORT LIABILITY
putting them on sale where there is no past history of hidden needles?
Since when has the sale of wearing apparel, without checking it for
lethal qualities, been an unreasonably dangerous thing to do? 113 Is
the vendor who sells shoes without palpating the inner soles of his
whole stock doing something unreasonably dangerous? If so, why not
require floorwalkers to palpate the pockets of all present on the chance
that one may be a hold-up man with a hidden gun which may kill a
customer? The "reasonable man" may be a paragon of virtue whose
motto is "safety first" but he is not an apotheosized archangel and he
does take some chances. The magnitude of the risk in these cases was
slight. Who has not been scratched frequently or had a nail in his
shoe? How often has it required more than a drop of iodine and a
day or two to remedy the trifling injury?
These decisions are not only a departure from sound theory but
on their facts they are unwholesome precedents which invite litigious
purchasers and unscrupulous lawyers to build up cases to mulct retailers
in damages.
For authority the majority opinion in- the Garvey case said that
the facts came under the rule declared in Heaven v. Pender,114 which
is entirely inapplicable. That case dealt with the duty of a drydock
owner to inspect his own equipment used for his own business pur-
poses. The case announced the rule which is restated in Section 392
of the Restatement of Torts, and there carefully distinguished from
the rules applying to a vendor. The opinion in the Santise case said
that the Garvey case "is the applicable precedent", and that Pearlman
v. Garrod Shoe Co," 5 "is very similar". The latter case has been
analyzed above and the only similarity is that both cases involved shoes.
The controlling facts are entirely different. The Santise opinion says
that the vendor's duty to inspect "requires the seller to discover defects
which may be found by inspection alone, as distinguished from dangers
so concealed that mechanical tests are needed to disclose them".
116
Until an authoritative pronouncement by the Court of Appeals is
handed down the New York law cannot be considered as settled, par-
ticularly by cases departing so far from sound tort theory and the
realities of life.
The third case, also decided by a divided court, is Ebbert v. Phila-
delphia Electric Co.117 The defendant sold, installed and demonstrated
113. "Life will have to be nmade over, and human nature transformed, before previ-
sion so extravagant can be accepted as the norm of conduct, the customary standard
to which behaviour must conform." Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339,
343, x62 N. E. 99, loo (1928) per Cardozo, Ch. J.
114. ii Q. B. D. So (1883).
115. 276 N. Y. I72, ii N. E. (2d) 718 (1937), cited note 56 supra.
116. 258 App. Div. 663, 665, I7 N. Y. S. (2d) 741, 743 (2d Dep't 1940).
117. 126 Pa. Super. 35r, II Atl. 384 (1937), affd 330 Pa. 257, 198 Atl. 323 (1938).
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an electric washing machine and wringer. The safety release bar was
defective in that a cam shaft at one end was bent. This did not show
up in the demonstration because the demonstrator happened (in good
faith) to tap the good end of the safety release and it worked. The
chamber containing the safety device was open at the bottom and if
the cam shaft had been inspected the defect could have been seen. In
using the wringer the purchaser caught her hand in the rollers, tapped
the defective end of the release bar with her free hand, but the release
did not operate and her caught hand was severaly injured. The wringer
was sold with the vendor's guarantee "against defects of manufacture
for a period of one year . . . and (vendor) will replace free, any
part which an examination by the company shall disclose to be de-
fective". There was testimony that the vendor had employees who
"serviced" the washers and that the vendor did make a routine inspec-
tion of the washers "only for appearance to make sure they are not
damaged by the railroad". The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff.
The Superior Court affirmed the judgment on the ground that
there was the breach of "an express warranty against mechanical de-
fects and the dealer thereby assumed the responsibility of the manu-
facturer for the working of the wringer". 118 The court also said, "In
view of the express warranty as to the condition of this wringer, it is
not necessary to decide whether a duty of inspection would have been
cast upon the dealer if he had not given an express warranty." 119
While it is not within the scope of this article to discuss the question
of warranty it would seem, as indicated by Mr. Justice Drew in his
dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court,1 20 that the vendor had not
warranted the safety of the machine but had merely agreed to replace,
without cost, any parts which were found to be defective.
In the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Maxey, writing for the ma-
jority of the court, said, "While not differing with the trial court and
the Superior Court in basing defendant's liability on breach of war-
ranty, we think an equally solid basis for recovery is defendant's
inadequate performance of the duty of inspection and demonstra-
tion." 121 He also said, "An imperative social duty requires a vendor
of a mechanical device to take at least such easily available precautions
as are reasonably likely to prevent serious injury to those who by using
such a device may be exposed to dangers arising from its defective
construction." 122 In refusing to agree that the vendor was a "mere
ii8. Id. at 363, 191 AtI. at 389.
119. Id. at 363, 191 AtI. at 39o.
120. 330 Pa. 257, 270, 198 At!. 323, 329 (1938).
121. Id. at 268, 198 At. at 329.
122. Id. at 263, i98 At!. at 327.
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conduit" from the manufacturer to the buyer, Mr. Justice Maxey said
that the vendor "took upon itself the duty of subjecting the wringer to
'inspection and tests' before selling. It is a legitimate inference that
the cost of such inspection and tests was added to the price of the
equipment." 123 This statement of fact was challenged in the dissent-
ing opinion, which appears to be more accurate in saying that "de-
fendant has done nothing but sell a washing machine and demonstrate
generally how to use it".
124
The majority opinion relied upon King Hardware Co. v. Ennis,125
Moore v. Jefferson Distilling & Denaturing Co.,. 2 6 Guinan v. Famous
Players-Lasky Corp.,-127 Restatement of Torts, Section 388, and Garvey
v. Namm. 28  While there is language in the King case to support Mr.
Justice Maxey, on its facts the case involves, as pointed out earlier, a
reckless statement by the vendor without knowledge of the facts. 1 29
The decision in the Moore case was reversed by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, which refused to recognize a duty of inspection.130  The
Guinan case involves the gift of a chattel known to be dangerous with-
out giving warning of the known danger. The Restatement section
applies to all suppliers of chattels and is limited to the case of a chattel
known to be, or likely to be, dangerous. The section imposes liability
only where the requirements of all three of its clauses (a), (b) and
(c) are fulfilled. The opinion quotes clause (c) but omits clauses (a)
and (b) and thus succeeds in the interesting mathematical feat of
making c a+b+c. The Garvey case, involving the basting needle in
the lady's wrapper, does support the opinion, and it is the only authority
cited in the opinion which does.13 1 As -the opinion purports to follow
existing authority rather than to make new law this actual lack of
support in the precedents relied upon seems significant in appraising
the weight of this case as an authoritative precedent.
123. Id. at 265, 198 Atl. at 327.
124. Id. at 272, 198 Atl. at 330.
125. 39 Ga. App. 355, 147 S. E. iig (1929), cited note 63 supra.
126. 12 La. App. 405, 123 So. 384 (1929), rev'd, i69 La. 1156, 126 So. 291 (1930.)
127. 267 Mass. 5oi, 167 N. E. 235 (I929), cited notes 26 and 29 supra.
128. 136 App. Div. 815, 121 N. Y. Supp. 4v (2d Dep't 1gio), cited note lo9
supra.
129. If the case stands for anything more it is, on its facts, contrary to State to
use v. Consolidated Gas, E. & P. Co., 146 Md. 390, 126 Atl. 1O5 (1924), and Camden
Fire Ins. Co. v. Peterman, 278 Mich. 615, 270 N. W. 807 (1937).
130. In addition Article 2531 of the Civil Code of Louisiana [LA. CIVIL CODE
ANN. (Dart, 1932) Art. 2531] provides that "The seller who knew not the vices of
the thing is only bound to restore the price, and to reimburse the expenses occa-
sioned by the sale . . . ." See discussion of this statute in Boyd v. J. C. Penney Co.,
195 So. 87, 89 (La. App. 1940).
131. The facts of Pound v. Popular Dry Goods Co., 139 S. W. (2d) 341 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940) in which there was a verdict and judgment for the defendant, also
involved the sale of a washing machine and wringer with a safety release bar which
failed to operate because of a mechanical defect.
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CONCLUSION
In this Article an endeavor has been made to cite and analyze every
case relating to a vendor's purely tort duty which could be found in the
reports. In view of the large number of people who are vendors (to
say nothing of purchasers) the subject seems worthy of consideration.
In any type of situation the question of imposing or not imposing lia-
bility is, in the last analysis, a question of public policy. Tort liability
has expanded greatly in the last century. It has been, on the whole, a
desirable expansion. Changed conditions have often cried out for a
change in the law. The enlarged liability of the manufacturer, for
example, and Judge Cardozo's masterly rationalization of the proper
basis for it, have met with almost universal approval. But the vendor's
position is fundamentally different from that of the manufacturer, and
it is difficult to see why the public welfare requires the imposition upon
vendors of this new duty of inspection. On the contrary it requires
continued adherence to the present weight of authority. Today the
purchaser generally has a cause of action against the manufacturer for
harm caused by a dangerously defective chattel. In many cases he has
a cause of action against even an innocent vendor for breach of an
express or implied warranty. The purchaser seems to have all the
protection he reasonably needs without leaving it to a jury to determine,
in retrospect, what the vendor might have found out if he had done
what the jury (now) thinks he should have done about examining a
chattel which he had no real reason to believe had anything the matter
with it. If the failure to inspect is called "negligence", the issue, on
the record made, will be for the jury in all but the occasional case.
How the jury will react is indicated in the cases of the needle in the
wrapper, the nail inside the shoe, and the wringer release bar which
failed to work.
